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 Breakout
- Chosin Reservoir
Seldom does a reader get the opportunity to read a true account of
modern battle that is so gripping, so detailed, and so unforgettable as
is this story of the attempt by 12,000 American Marines to fight their
way out of an encirclement by seven divisions of Chinese and Korean
troops at the Chosin Reservoir in Korea. Written by an ex-Marine who was
himself a wounded veteran in Korea, its lines wring of the accuracy and
poignancy only eyewitnesses could tell about the plight of the men
caught in the snow, wind, and sub-zero cold to fight off the vastly
superior number of Chinese and Koreans and escape from the trap that had
been set for them. This is a riveting story well told.
The situation was bleak; it was mid-winter, and the Marines were cut off
from supply lines and exposed to the extremes of weather, surrounded by
seven divisions of better equipped and better situated Chinese and
Korean troops who were most fanatical in their pursuit of them, ready to
move in and annihilate the whole Marine force. The Marines, meanwhile,
had little or no air support due to the terrible weather conditions,
were relatively low on ammunition and other supplies, and the terrain
was so formidable that they were quite effectively cut off and isolated
and on their own. There could be little or no help from outside to save
them
 The
Korean War
This first truly international history of the Korean War argues that by
its timing, its course, and its outcome it functioned as a substitute
for World War III. Stueck draws on recently available materials from
seven countries, plus the archives of the United Nations, presenting a
detailed narrative of the diplomacy of the conflict and a broad
assessment of its critical role in the Cold War. He emphasizes the
contribution of the United Nations, which at several key points in the
conflict provided an important institutional framework within which less
powerful nations were able to restrain the aggressive tendencies of the
United States.
In Stueck's view, contributors to the U.N. cause in Korea provided
support not out of any abstract commitment to a universal system of
collective security but because they saw an opportunity to influence
U.S. policy. Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950 brought
with it the threat of world war, but at that time and in other instances
prior to the armistice in July 1953, America's NATO allies and Third
World neutrals succeeded in curbing American adventurism. While
conceding the tragic and brutal nature of the war, Stueck suggests that
it helped to prevent the occurrence of an even more destructive conflict
in Europe.
 About
Face
About Face is an odessey to read. Like battle itself, it is full of
pages of sheer terror separated by long passages of nervous boredom as
Hackworth sought to find some identity apart from battle. The Army made
him a man, and as long as there were wars to fight he honored "his
mother" the military with an almost unbelievable string of courageous
achievements in battle. But when the time to kill was over, Hackworth
lost himself, as he more or less admits. He candidly admits not only his
many adulteries but his fundamental inability to honor his wife and
children. He admits constant theft, and tolerated any immorality that
would help his unit. Through two thirds of the book you want to enlist
to be a stud like Hack. In the last pages you want to slap him in the
face for betraying the Army. He was a law unto himself (as the title to
the penultimate chapter confesses), both as a maverick in the Pentagon
or as the quasi-warlord of a fire base in Vietnam. Many, including Hack,
have suggested that he was the model of Colonel Kurtz in Coppola's
Apocalypse Now. Whether or not this is true, the comparison is
chillingly apt, only Hackworth may be more frightening. Hackworth was
genuinely patriotic, undeniably courageous and damn effective in killing
Chinese in Korea and Vietcong. But this same warrior spirit refused to
bow to any moral principal except his own concept of loyalty to and
concern for his troops. "The horror, horror." He saw clearly that
guerrilla warfare required a guerilla-style response from the Army (a
lesson of continuing significance in modern political battles like
Afghanistan), and he clearly understood the political nature of the
Vietnam War. But the moral relativism of his "platoon-as-tribe"
principles could not be extended to a wider audience precisely because
they were unprincipled. Hackworth's tactical advice is still needed, and
his war stories are as good as they get. But he unwittingly embodies the
horror and paradox of the modern warrior: To serve the highest
principles of man, such as freedom and justice, while destroying men,
and perhaps himself, in the process.
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